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Contrary to the skepticism of some authors about the artistic potential or 
even the possibility of fi lms being improvised artworks, I argue that not 
only is it conceptually possible for many elements of the fi lmmaking pro-
cess to be performed in an improvisatory manner, but that a number of 
existing fi lms and fi lmmaking practices provide examples of the realiza-
tion of such possibilities. Further, I argue that these examples show that 
improvisation by fi lmmakers can enhance the aesthetic or artistic value 
of a fi lm. As well as its artistic potential, I consider some social and 
ethical implications of improvisatory approaches to fi lmmaking, and by 
extension to art in general.
Keywords: Improvisation, improvised fi lmmaking, philosophy of 
fi lm, cinema aesthetics, social aesthetics.
1. Introduction
In 1980 Virginia Wexman noted that fi lmmakers’ use of improvisation1 
has received little critical attention, and since then the question of im-
provisation in cinema has continued to be largely unaddressed, both 
by philosophers of art and by scholars writing on fi lm in other disci-
plines. In the philosophy of art, this should be understood in the con-
text of a general lack of attention to improvisation, where most of what 
philosophers have written on improvisation has focused on music.2 In 
1 My focus will be on fi ctional narrative cinema, bracketing documentary and 
experimental fi lm, partly to keep the paper to a manageable length but also because 
the authors I respond to focus on fi ctional narrative fi lms.
2 On the scarcity of philosophical articles on improvisation, see Alperson 2014, 
and note that where Alperson shows a disparity between articles in aesthetics 
journals on music and those dealing with musical improvisation, topic searches in 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, the Journal of Aesthetic Education, and 
the British Journal of Aesthetics (as of April, 2018) show that, of those articles that 
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writing on fi lm from other disciplines, including ‘fi lm theory’ and more 
practically-focused books on fi lmmaking, there is slightly more to be 
found, although nearly all is in reference to specifi c fi lmmakers with 
reputations for having their actors improvise, such as John Cassavetes 
or Mike Leigh. Less than a handful of papers discuss improvisation in 
cinema more generally, with their authors—Wexman (1980), Berkeley 
(2011), and Froger (2017)—also focusing primarily on actors’ perfor-
mances and dialogue, without considering other ways in which a fi lm 
might be improvised, in addition to the acting.3
With this paper I hope to demonstrate that improvisation in the 
medium of cinema is not only an issue of philosophical and aesthetic in-
terest, meriting greater attention than has hitherto been paid to it, but 
that improvisational fi lmmaking practices can be artistically valuable 
and can result in aesthetically rich audience experiences.4 I consider 
how fi lmmaking can involve improvisation in ways that include, but go 
beyond, a fi lm’s actors improvising, looking at opportunities for those 
‘behind the scenes’—e.g. camera operators, editors, directors, etc.—to 
improvise in their roles in creating a fi lm. How does counting fi lms 
among improvised artworks affect our understanding of improvisation 
or of cinema as an art form? As well as the potential artistic value of 
such practices, what social or ethical possibilities might be realized by 
improvisational approaches to fi lmmaking instead of the traditional 
model employed in the mainstream commercial fi lmmaking industry 
as well as in many independent and student productions?5
deal with improvisation in the arts, the majority of them discuss improvisation in 
music as opposed to other art forms (cf. Bresnahan 2014).
3 The exception to this is Sterritt (2000). While Froger notes that a cameraperson 
recording improvising actors must adapt to their performances and so must also 
improvise, she doesn’t explore this point further. As for practical writing on 
fi lmmaking, Michael Rabiger’s Directing: Film Techniques and Aesthetics (2003), 
which is otherwise open to alternative approaches, mentions improvisation only in 
the context of working with actors, mainly in terms of ‘warm ups’ in rehearsals or 
collaborative story creation (Rabiger 2003: 114–18, 164–66), with no discussion of 
how other elements of a fi lm might be improvised.
4 This is not to say that taking an improvisatory approach to making a fi lm will 
always, or even often, lead to an artistically or aesthetically positive result—only 
that it can, and that when it does, what the results are and how they work (and what 
this can tell us about cinema more broadly) are worth attending to.
5 In this ‘traditional model’, fi lms are scripted and largely pre-determined in 
their content and form (e.g. through storyboarding), with the production involving 
a hierarchical division of labour. Finding citations to support my claim that this 
model is employed in most independent and student productions (at least in North 
America) would be possible but time-consuming and, ultimately, no less anecdotal 
than references to my own experience. I will simply note that in my experience on 
low-budget fi lm shoots during and after fi lm school, the degree to which people felt 
they had to imitate ‘Hollywood’ or television industry methods of production, when 
there was no external pressure to do so and when they thought they were doing 
something ‘alternative’, was striking.
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Before discussing what improvisational approaches to fi lmmaking 
can involve, it is necessary to address arguments against the claim 
that fi lms can be improvised in any meaningful sense, and against the 
potential for improvisation in fi lmmaking to be of artistic value. I be-
gin in §2 by defending the possibility of a genuinely improvised fi lm 
and its potential for artistic value against criticisms from Marianne 
Froger and, to a lesser extent, Wexman. After showing their arguments 
for these criticisms to fail, in §3 I draw on Gilbert Ryle’s (1976) broad 
understanding of improvisation along with more recent work on im-
provisation in the philosophy of art by Philip Alperson (1984, 1998), 
David Davies (2004, 2011), and Aili Bresnahan (2014, 2015), to offer 
an account of what it takes for a particular work to count as an impro-
vised artwork.6 In §4, I discuss how various elements of the fi lmmaking 
process might be improvised in this sense, and explore their potential 
for contributing positively to a fi lm’s artistic value, considering the ef-
fect they can have on viewers’ experiences of a fi lm and the difference 
this can make to how non-improvised fi lms are typically experienced. 
I conclude in §5 by considering the social or ethical potential of these 
forms of cinematic improvisation.
2. Challenges to the possibility 
and artistic potential of improvised cinema
In “Improvisation in New Wave Cinema: Beneath the Myth, the Social” 
(2017), Marianne Froger argues that statements made by New Wave 
fi lmmakers like Jean-Luc Godard concerning the improvised status of 
their fi lms were largely false, and “[i]n fact, improvisation was rarely 
practiced” (Froger 2017: 235). Even if true,7 her contention that these 
fi lms weren’t improvised, or weren’t to the extent that their makers 
claimed, would not count against the possibility that other fi lms might 
have been, or that fi lms in general can be improvised in their creation. 
Still, Froger presents three criticisms in the course of her discussion 
that cast doubt on the possibility of a genuinely improvised fi lm, or, 
assuming such a fi lm were possible, on its potential to be artistically 
successful.
2.1 Froger’s three challenges
The fi rst challenge follows from her defi nition of improvisation as 
“the act by which one simultaneously composes and executes a musi-
cal piece or ... simultaneously composes and utters dialogue” (Froger 
2017: 234) and her additional claim that this defi nition “emphasizes 
the simultaneity of the time of invention, execution, and audience re-
6 For simplicity, I use ‘artworks’ to refer to objects (paintings, poems, scores, etc.) 
and to performances, bracketing the question of whether a performance of a scripted 
or scored work is itself a distinct work of art.
7 Unfortunately Froger provides little evidence to back up this claim.
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ception” (Froger 2017: 234). Since there is nearly always8 a temporal 
gap between a fi lm’s composition and execution and its reception by 
audiences, with the fi lm’s ‘composition’ including the selection and ed-
iting of shots from all the footage recorded, Froger suggests that it is 
impossible for cinema to be a genuinely improvisational art form, even 
if the actors were improvising, or if some other form of improvisation 
occurred during fi lming.
The second challenge counts against the possibility that any impro-
visation that occurred in front of the camera can contribute to a fi lm’s 
artistic properties, since even if “improvisation in what is fi lmed, or 
in the act of fi lming itself” does occur, it “is very diffi cult to detect in 
the viewing of a fi lm” due to the absence of ‘codes’ or representational 
conventions to signal that what an audience is encountering was im-
provised (Froger 2017: 234). As such, part of a fi lm that wasn’t impro-
vised might look as if it had been, and could be carefully staged to give 
viewers the impression of spontaneity without being spontaneously 
produced. While this objection allows that improvising can take place 
during a fi lm’s creation, by challenging whether it can be relevant to 
our experience or appreciation of the fi nished fi lm, it counts against the 
possibility that a cinematic work overall can be an improvised artwork 
in any robust sense.
Froger’s third challenge, a version of which is also found in Wexman, 
holds that even if improvisation occurs during parts of the fi lmmaking 
process, and even if viewers are aware that what they are watching 
was improvised, this awareness is likely to contribute negatively to the 
fi lm’s artistic value. Froger claims that improvisation “would have to 
remain invisible in order that it not break what fi lm theorists have 
called the ‘effect of the real’ of the cinematic image” (Froger 2017: 236), 
referring to an alleged disposition of the medium to lead viewers to 
experience the characters and events they are encountering as if they 
are real and being witnessed through an invisible window or ‘fourth 
wall’. Froger suggests that this failure to maintain the ‘effect of the 
real’ “explains the commercial failure of Truffaut’s second fi lm [Tirez 
sur la pianiste/Shoot the Piano Player (1962)], which was much more 
characterized by improvisation than his fi rst” (Froger 2017: 236). Simi-
larly, Wexman writes that improvised scenes “can detract from a fi lm’s 
impact by presenting experience that has not been shaped with an au-
dience in mind” (Wexman 1980: 30), faulting directors such as Cas-
savetes and Jacques Rivette for being “insensitive to the desirability 
of making their creation accessible to [the] public” and for “indulging 
the actors at the expense of the audience’s needs” (Wexman 1980: 31). 
The worry is that if improvisation is detected in a fi lm (and hence could 
count as part of the fi lm’s artistic properties) it will risk alienating 
8 Exceptions include live television or internet broadcasts, which Froger doesn’t 
consider. However, artworks in this form are rare, and are beyond the scope of her 
concern with French New Wave fi lmmaking.
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viewers by straying too far from familiar cinematic conventions, or by 
lacking the technical polish that Froger and Wexman take to contrib-
ute positively to a fi lm’s artistic value.
Taken together, these criticisms cast doubt on whether fi lms can 
be genuinely improvised artworks, given the nature of the cinematic 
process, including the temporal gap between creation and reception 
and the role played by editing, and, if they can be, on whether this pos-
sibility would be worth realizing. Even if the fi rst challenge were to be 
met and cinema was demonstrated to be an artform that allowed for 
works to be improvised, the other two challenges would still need to be 
addressed in order to show that the possibilities for improvisation that 
cinema allowed were worth attending to. Fortunately, all three can be 
met by showing that the arguments given for them are fl awed, requir-
ing the acceptance of positions that are too strong or implausible.
2.2 Response to the second challenge
Froger’s second challenge—i.e. that improvisation during the making 
of a fi lm can’t be artistically relevant because audiences can’t know 
that what they are seeing was improvised, since an improvised perfor-
mance could be perceptually indistinguishable from a scripted one—is 
too strong, since it would also count against improvised live musical or 
theatrical performances, for which there are also no distinct ‘forms of 
representation’ that allow audiences to know that what they are see-
ing or hearing is being spontaneously generated as opposed to having 
been pre-scripted and rehearsed to appear spontaneous. Musical per-
formances (e.g. some of Anthony Braxton’s or John Zorn’s pieces) can 
be thoroughly composed and tightly rehearsed but designed to sound 
extemporaneous and free-form, or even disorganized, as can theatrical 
performances. Even when there are established practices or ‘codes’ in 
a genre that would signal to knowledgeable audience members that 
what they see or hear is improvised, these could also be incorporated 
into a script or composition and be part of a pre-planned work rather 
than an actual improvisation. For instance, a performance done in the 
style of a Second City comedy improv could make use of actors planted 
in the audience who suggest themes on which the actors then appear 
to improvise, with everything, including the on-stage actors’ solicita-
tion of themes from the audience and the ersatz audience member’s 
suggestions, being part of the script. Thus, the fact that a fi lm’s audi-
ence might only be aware that what they were watching had a feeling 
of spontaneity, but be unable to know that what they were seeing was 
improvised, does not count against the possibility or artistic relevance 
of improvisation in cinema without also counting against the possibil-
ity or artistic relevance of improvisation in any medium.
Furthermore, this challenge assumes that only those features of an 
artwork that are manifest to audiences are relevant for that work’s 
artistic value, but this is also implausible, since it would discount any 
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aspects of a work’s creation that were not perceivable in the fi nished 
product. However, aspects of a work’s creation can generate the per-
ceptible properties of the fi nished work, and so can be artistically rel-
evant for the work’s ontological status and its aesthetic value, without 
themselves being perceptible. One example would be the choice of lens, 
shutter speed, or fi lm stock for a particular shot; while such a choice 
affects how the shot will look, and so should count as an artistically 
relevant choice, an audience member seeing the shot in the fi nished 
fi lm will not be able to perceive the technical choice that resulted in 
what they are seeing, especially since the same effect can result from 
digital manipulation during editing, with digital fi lters mimicking the 
look of certain fi lm stocks or lens types. Additionally, facts about the 
creative process that are not manifest in, and don’t directly lead to 
the appearance of, an artwork can still be relevant for the status and 
artistic value of that work. The fact that Rodin initially conceived of 
his sculpture of Balzac as a nude before deciding to present the fi gure 
draped in a form-concealing cloak is relevant for understanding and 
evaluating this sculpture, even though this aspect of the work’s history 
can’t be seen from viewing the fi nished sculpture.9
2.3 Response to the third challenge
If this is right, then, assuming Froger’s fi rst challenge can be met and 
that it is possible for fi lms to be improvised artworks, the fact that a 
fi lm was improvised will be relevant for a proper understanding of it 
as an artwork and hence for a proper evaluation of its artistic value. 
This leaves open the possibility, however, that it will count negatively 
towards its artistic value, so Froger’s third challenge—also raised by 
Wexman—still needs to be met in order to show that improvisation is an 
artistically interesting or desirable possibility for fi lmmakers to avail 
themselves of. However, it isn’t diffi cult to meet this challenge, since 
both Froger and Wexman appear to confl ate commercial success, or au-
dience popularity, with artistic quality. This can be seen most clearly 
in Froger’s point about Truffaut’s Shoot the Piano Player—the fact that 
it was less fi nancially successful than Truffaut’s fi rst fi lm, Les quatre 
cents coups/The 400 Blows (1959), or even less successful with critics at 
the time, does not count against its artistic quality; critical judgment 
can be mistaken, especially when a work is new, and when it comes to 
audience popularity, the ‘customer’ can be wrong. While Shoot the Piano 
Player may not be as artistically successful as The 400 Blows, whether 
or not it has less commercial success because it featured more improvi-
sation doesn’t mean its artistic value will be lower for the same reason.
9 For the example of Rodin’s Monument to Balzac and the aesthetic relevance 
of the history of a work’s creation, see Wollheim (1980: 188–99). See also Davies 
(2006) contra the ‘aesthetic empiricism’ Froger must presuppose in order to hold that 
properties of an artwork must be perceptible in order to be relevant for its artistic 
value.
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While Wexman is right to maintain that improvisation requires 
discipline to carry out in a way that is artistically successfully when 
presented to an audience rather than occurring privately in rehearsal, 
and that simply making things up at random can result in incoherence 
and artistic failure (Wexman 1980: 30–31), this is no more a problem 
for improvisation in cinema than in other artforms.10 In order to avoid 
incoherence, jazz musicians will also need to improvise with discipline 
and active attention to what they are doing at any moment, to how it 
fi ts with what they’ve just done, and to where it might be leading in 
terms of possible directions for the development of themes or ideas con-
tained in what they’re currently playing, and must do so on the basis 
of skill and a strong working knowledge of their art form.11 Moreover, a 
work that can seem incoherent to an audience can in fact be internally 
coherent, highly complex, and artistically successful, with the audience 
missing these features of the work because of its novelty or its failure to 
conform to expectations based on familiar patterns from other works. 
As Eric Lewis (2017) describes, the genre-mixing improvisations per-
formed by the Art Ensemble of Chicago in Paris in 1969 were initially 
met with confusion by critics and many audience members, although 
what appeared at fi rst to some as incoherence was understood by oth-
ers in terms of complex aesthetic strategies of hybridity and what Lew-
is calls “aesthetic thickening” (Lewis 2017: 135–36). This shows how 
a work that is coherent on its own criteria can be mistaken for ‘mere 
chaos’ by those who expect it to follow a criterion of coherence alien to 
that particular work.
Thus, even if an artwork—whether improvised or not—is coherent 
and artistically successful, it can be mistakenly judged to be incoherent 
by audiences who fail to apprehend what the work is in fact doing and 
instead assume its author was aiming to do something else, but fail-
ing.12 This suggests that the problem Wexman claims for the directors 
she cites—Cassavetes, Robert Altman, and D. A. Pennebaker—may in 
fact be a problem with the audience members’ reception and judgment 
of their fi lms, and not a problem with the fi lms or the fi lmmakers’ prac-
tices. In Kendall Walton’s terms in his “Categories of Art” (1970), this 
would be a matter of an audience member approaching, experiencing, 
and evaluating a work as if it belonged to one ‘category’—e.g. ‘scripted 
classical narrative fi lm’—when it belongs to, and is properly judged 
within, another ‘category’—e.g. ‘improvised ensemble fi lm’. The same 
properties of a work that, in Walton’s terms, count as ‘standard’ and 
‘contra-standard’ for one category could count as the reverse for anoth-
10 This is also no more a problem for improvisation than for any artistic technique 
or method, since each requires discipline or at least judgment to employ successfully, 
and any can be used poorly, resulting in artistic failure.
11 Cf. Alperson (1984: 22): “Even the freest improviser, far from creating ex 
nihilo, improvises against some sort of musical context.”
12 Cf. McLuhan (1964: 239): “When they are initially proposed, new systems of 
knowledge do not look like improvements and innovations. They look like chaos.”
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er (see Walton 1970: 338–42). For instance, scenes between characters 
in classical narrative fi lms standardly contain non-overlapping dia-
logue where each character, in turn, clearly and concisely articulates a 
statement which is made in order to further that character’s goals and 
dramatic motivation in both the scene and the narrative overall.
Where it might be a ‘mistake’ for a fi lm in this category to contain a 
scene of dialogue that ‘goes nowhere’ or in which actors deliver lines in 
a way that makes it diffi cult for the audience to hear every word, these 
things might not be contra-standard, but might in fact be standard, for 
scenes in a fi lm of a different type made with different artistic aims. 
Hence, it can be a category mistake on the viewer’s part to judge an ex-
tended scene of dialogue in, say, Cassavetes’ Husbands (1970), Jacques 
Rivette’s Out 1 (1971), or Altman’s Nashville (1975), in which charac-
ters talk over one another, struggle to express themselves, and speak 
and act without ‘advancing the plot’, as being artistically fl awed if this 
judgment is based on their approaching the fi lm with the expectation 
that it will be like other fi lms with which they are more familiar and 
that it will aim to do what these fi lms do. Such expectations can get 
in the way of the viewer seeing what the fi lm is doing, and seeing how 
such a scene can be ‘meaningful’ or even coherent in a different way. 
Just as improvised musical or theatrical performances call for differ-
ent forms of engagement and evaluation by audiences, even if the fact 
of improvisation is not directly perceptible without some background 
knowledge of the process by which it is produced, and just as certain 
properties that might count as artistic fl aws in a non-improvised work 
might not count as such for an improvised one (cf. Sparshott 1982: 255), 
fi lms that make use of improvisation will call for being experienced and 
judged differently than traditionally scripted fi lms.
So far my responses to these challenges have assumed that fi lms 
can be genuinely improvised artworks, where this is what Froger’s fi rst 
challenge calls into question. This challenge still needs to be addressed 
in order to fully counter Froger’s skepticism about improvised cinema.
2.4 Response to the fi rst challenge
With regard to this challenge—that the temporal gap between a fi lm’s 
creation and its reception, including the editing that the recorded im-
ages and sounds go through, do not allow for fi lms to be improvised 
artworks—it is puzzling that the defi nition of improvisation on which 
this challenge is based limits improvisation to musical pieces and to 
dialogue. It is also odd that Froger claims her defi nition “emphasizes 
the simultaneity of ... audience reception” with creation and execution 
(Froger 2017: 234), when it makes no mention of audience reception. 
Nevertheless, assuming that Froger accepts the possibility of impro-
visation with respect to more than just music and dialogue, such as 
dance, or an actor’s movements and not just speech, her position would 
seem to be either that two things—composition and execution—or that 
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three—these, plus audience reception—must be simultaneous for im-
provisation.
The latter position, which is what she seems to endorse when read 
literally, would entail that recorded as opposed to live musical perfor-
mances can’t be improvisations, but this seems false and fails to accord 
with actual practices surrounding improvised music.13 It is implausible 
to hold that a listener who is present at a performance of a free improvi-
sation hears an improvised piece of music, but that someone listening to 
a live recording of the performance after it has occurred, and who hears 
the same sounds, does not. Hence, a defi nition of improvisation that re-
quires all three factors to be simultaneous is not plausibly tenable. But 
if only the simultaneity of a work’s composition and its execution are 
taken to be necessary for that work to count as improvised,14 there is no 
reason to discount the possibility of a fi lm being an improvised artwork 
so long as what was recorded, and what the viewer subsequently sees, 
was something the improviser came up with in the moment of record-
ing. Thus, in order to succeed, Froger’s objection would need to rest on 
an implausibly narrow defi nition of improvisation, and so the possibility 
of improvisational cinema cannot be discounted for this reason.
Even if the temporal delay between a work’s composition and ex-
ecution and its reception doesn’t discount it from being an improvised 
artwork, the fact that a fi lm’s composition encompasses more than the 
camera recording what is occurring in front of it, including the selection 
and editing of the recorded material later in the production process, 
could be seen to raise a further challenge to the possibility of a fi lm as 
a whole being an improvised artwork. This may be the point of Froger’s 
comment about how the “after-the-fact construction of a story’s spatio-
temporal continuity” (Froger 2017: 234–35) can impede the audience’s 
ability to encounter, as improvisation, any improvising recorded by the 
camera. And more than just the story’s spatio-temporal continuity can 
be constructed during the editing of a fi lm, including interactions be-
tween characters. Actors can be fi lmed on separate occasions speaking 
their lines to an empty room and the shots cut together to present an 
interactive conversation between the characters, and even the expres-
sive tone of the ‘performance’ of a single actor can be created through 
combining different takes, when the actor’s performance lacked this 
tone in any one of these takes. What the audience encounters as the 
cinematic work is ultimately the result of the editing process and not 
just, or primarily, of what went into recording the parts that are edited, 
with many of the work’s artistic properties having to do with the selec-
13 A frequently discussed, and useful, example of a record of an improvised 
musical performance where listening to the record is widely accepted as listening 
to an improvisation is Keith Jarrett’s 1975 Köln Concert. See Davies (2011: 135–43) 
for a discussion of this work and the issue of recordings of improvised performances.
14 This would allow for recorded music that no one other than the performer(s) 
hear(s) in the moment of its playing/recording to count as improvised, which 
certainly seems plausible.
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tion and arranging of recorded images, and the combination of these 
with sounds that are recorded separately and subjected to further edit-
ing and rearrangement. As such, it might seem that even if improvisa-
tion occurred in the moment of fi lming, a fi lm qua fi lm cannot itself be 
an improvised, rather than a designed and planned, artwork.
While this objection wouldn’t discount the possibility of a fi lm that 
consisted of a single unbroken shot being an improvised work if the 
acting and fi lming of this take were improvised, such fi lms are rare, 
and restricting cinematic improvisation to these fi lms would be overly 
limiting. A defi nition that included only these fi lms would exclude near-
ly all of the fi lms that in practice are considered to have been impro-
vised, whether those by Cassavetes and Rivette mentioned by Wexman, 
the ensemble comedies of Christopher Guest (Best in Show [2000]) or 
Chris Lillie (Summer Heights High [2007]), or more recent independent 
‘mumblecore’ and ‘micro-budget’ fi lms by directors such as Joe Swan-
berg (Hannah Takes the Stairs [2007], Nights and Weekends [2008]), 
Aaron Katz (Quiet City [2007]), Chris Smith (The Pool [2007]), and Sean 
Garrity (Zooey & Adam [2009], Blood Pressure [2012]). As David Davies 
has argued in favour of what he calls the “pragmatic constraint” (Davies 
2004: 17–20), when an ontological theory of art contrasts with how prac-
titioners understand what they are doing or making, the burden of proof 
is on the advocate of the ‘revisionary’ position to present an ‘error the-
ory’ explaining the misunderstanding. While Froger claims something 
like this with respect to Godard’s early fi lms, more support is needed for 
this claim than Froger gives for it to meet the aforementioned burden of 
proof in Godard’s case—and it still wouldn’t count against others’ claims 
that their fi lms were improvised to some signifi cant extent.
Additionally, the objection relies on two assumptions that may be 
common but which are not beyond question: (i) that an artwork counts 
as an improvised work only if all of its constitutive and artistically 
relevant properties result from simultaneous composition and execu-
tion; and (ii) that the selection, arrangement, and editing of material 
is incompatible with improvisation, or is not something that can itself 
be improvised. If these assumptions are rejected—and both are chal-
lenged by Sterritt (2000) in his consideration of the writing practices of 
Beat authors Jack Kerouac and William S. Burroughs alongside para-
digmatic examples of improvisation by bebop musicians—it opens the 
way for allowing genuinely improvised cinematic works. Ultimately, 
in order to endorse or oppose Froger’s challenges, and so to answer the 
question “Can fi lms be improvised artworks?”, the questions of what 
makes any artwork count as an improvised work, and how this might 
apply to cinematic works in particular, must be answered.
3. What makes an artwork an improvised work?
Some artworks can include improvised elements without plausibly 
counting as improvised works on the whole—e.g. a concerto that in-
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cludes an improvised cadenza but which it not otherwise improvised 
by its performers—whereas others such as Jarrett’s Köln Concert more 
plausibly count as improvised works. Distinguishing between impro-
vised artworks and artworks that merely involve some amount of im-
provisation requires a theory of improvisation in general. Gilbert Ryle 
(1976) presents an account of improvisation in relation to everyday ac-
tions and speech, emphasizing that his account goes beyond any special 
concern with artistic creation (Ryle 1976: 69–70). For Ryle, improvisa-
tion is a central part of intelligence having to do with our ability to be 
innovative, original, and unmechanical in thinking and acting. This is 
a factor in all ‘higher-level’ thinking, which Ryle argues cannot sim-
ply be a matter of direct step-by-step progression from one thought to 
another but must involve a certain degree of ‘ad hockery’ (Ryle 1976: 
71–72). We improvise, in this sense, when we respond to a particu-
lar situation in an unplanned and unrehearsed way, not following any 
prior model; “in a conversation or a debate, since what I am to say to 
you next depends partly on how you are going to complete your current 
sentence, I can harbour no internal ‘tape’ already impressed with my 
impending remark or retort” (Ryle 1976: 74, my emphasis).
Such action is intentional insofar as we are not acting unconsciously 
or automatically from habit, but is, as he puts it, a “thinking-up of a 
wanted something without the execution of any successive pieces of 
thinking-out or thinking-over” (Ryle 1976: 71, my emphasis). While our 
action will not be entirely without precedent, drawing on our past expe-
rience and the “know-how” we’ve gained from it (Ryle 1976: 77), it will 
be particular to the occasion on which it is done or uttered; “[t]o a partly 
novel situation”, he notes, “the response is necessarily partly novel, else 
it is not a response” (Ryle 1976: 73). Since in everyday life we frequently 
act or speak without carrying out the steps of a pre-formed, specifi c plan 
‘to a T’, but instead think as we act or speak, modifying as we go any 
‘plan’ we may have had in mind, improvisation is an everyday ability 
that every mentally competent adult will exercise to some degree. As 
Ryle puts it, improvisation is essentially the capacity to be “not a tram, 
but a bus” (Ryle 1976: 69)—i.e. not to be limited to following a track laid 
down in advance, in a fi xed direction and towards a predetermined des-
tination, but to be able to choose, and to change, one’s course.
When applied to artistic creation and performance, Ryle’s account 
supports Froger’s emphasis on the simultaneity of composition and ex-
ecution, if ‘execution’ is understood as making the choices and carry-
ing out the actions that go into forming, or performing, a work, and if 
composition is understood as ‘invention’ or ‘planning’, i.e. as conceiving, 
contemplating, and deliberating about these choices and actions and 
their anticipated results.15 This fi ts Alperson’s defi nition of improvisa-
15 While Froger most frequently uses the term ‘composition’, she also uses 
‘invention’ synonymously, and seems to mean by both something equivalent to 
‘conception’, ‘planning’, or ‘designing’.
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tion as spontaneity in creation (Alperson 1984: 17), along with Cur-
tis Carter’s similar characterization of improvisation as involving the 
“suspension of set structures for a practice and the introduction of non-
traditional elements [requiring] the power to invent new forms sponta-
neously” (Carter 2000: 181), and Aili Bresnahan’s defi nition of impro-
visational artistry as “thinking-while-doing [...] a sort of spontaneous 
agency that involves both conscious and spontaneous artistic choices 
that take place during performance” (Bresnahan 2014: 87, 91).16 Spon-
taneous creation is not creation ex nihilo, but creation resulting from 
a set of actions that was not entirely pre-meditated but was conceived 
and intended by the agent in the moment of carrying them out. On all 
the accounts mentioned above, we can say that a part of an artwork 
is improvised insofar as the artist conceives of that part of the work 
as being a certain way (composition) in the course of performing the 
action that realizes it in this way (execution), rather than following a 
pre-existing plan. For instance, part of a musical performance will be 
improvised if and only if what the musician is playing is not ‘thought 
out’ in advance, but ‘thought up’ in the moment as she is playing it; 
likewise, part of a painting will be improvised if and only if the decision 
to apply a particular colour to a particular part of the canvass with a 
particular manner of brush stroke, etc., occurs simultaneously with the 
painter’s hand and arm moving the brush in this manner.
If a creative decision is improvised when it is unpremeditated in 
this way, then most, and arguably all, artistic creation involves im-
provisation to some degree. Regarding dance, Bresnahan argues that 
“the setting and conditions of a live performance always require the 
performer to be aware of his or her performing environment in an ‘on-
line’ way, making on-the-spot adjustments either to improve a perfor-
mance or to correct a problem if something goes wrong” (Ryle 1976: 92, 
my emphasis). Even live dance performances done according to a pre-
established choreography, she notes, involve some improvising in how 
the dancers move to interpret the choreography in the moment, insofar 
as their movements aren’t mechanical reproductions of the choreogra-
pher’s instructions and insofar as interpretation is involved in translat-
ing these instructions into actual bodily movements. Similarly, Gould 
and Keaton argue that this holds for musical performance and score 
interpretation, and R. Keith Sawyer goes further to argue that, at least 
on certain understandings of art such as those found in Dewey (1934) 
and Collingwood (1938), all artistic creation involves improvisation in 
Ryle’s sense, at some point in the creative process, insofar as the work 
is a (new) creation and not a reproduction of an already-existing form 
(Sawyer 2000: 152). Despite his distaste for aesthetics, Ryle agrees, 
noting that “verse composition cannot be merely a well-drilled opera-
16 Gould and Keaton (2000) challenge spontaneity as a necessary part of 
improvisation, but see Davies (2011: 151–54) for a reply to Gould and Keaton and a 
defence of spontaneity being a necessary part of improvisation.
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tion [since] if Wordsworth’s seventh sonnet had been a repetition of his 
sixth sonnet, it would not have been a new sonnet, and so not have been 
a new composition” (Ryle 1976: 70).
This may explain what it is for an artist to improvise during part of 
the creation of a work, and so for part of a work to be improvised, but 
we need more to classify an artwork as an improvised artwork overall. I 
suggest that this is a matter of degree and that it is helpful to think of a 
spectrum with works that involve a faithful adherence to a pre-existing 
plan or model at one extreme—e.g. a hyperrealist painting made by 
copying a blown-up photograph, like Chuck Close’s Self Portrait—and 
works for which all artistically signifi cant properties are the result of 
simultaneous and spontaneous invention and execution—e.g. Jarrett’s 
Köln Concert—at the other. A work as a whole, then, will be more or 
less improvised qua artwork to the extent that more or fewer of its 
artistically relevant properties are brought about through improvisa-
tion on the part of the artist(s), and to the extent that the properties so 
brought about contribute to the artistic character and value—whether 
positive or negative—of the work itself. Not all of a work’s aestheti-
cally relevant properties need to result from improvisation, then, in 
order for the work to count as an improvised work, just some signifi cant 
number, and to some signifi cant degree. What this number and degree 
are, and what will count as signifi cant, will plausibly differ from one 
work to another, and it is plausible that they will be relative to the 
medium and genre of the work; the criteria for determining what will 
count as an improvised dance or musical performance may differ from 
the criteria for determining what will count as an improvised paint-
ing or novel. While the exact threshold may be ‘fuzzy’, the standards 
established within a particular practice and for a particular medium 
or genre can go some way towards settling whether certain works are 
improvised—e.g. many Charlie Parker solos—or whether they merely 
involve improvisation—e.g. concertos featuring cadenzas.
One virtue of this defi nition of improvised artworks is that it is open 
enough to include many works that are generally considered impro-
vised but which a stronger account that required all aspects of a work 
to be simultaneously invented and executed would exclude, without 
having to include every original artwork, given the distinction between 
improvised works and works involving improvisation. Another is that 
it allows for different artforms to have different criteria for works to 
count as improvised. The lack of attention paid by philosophers of art 
to improvisation in certain artforms may be due to an assumption 
that the criteria for what counts as improvisation in artforms based 
in live performance, such as music, dance, and theatre, are the criteria 
for all artistic improvisation, leading to artforms that result in ‘prod-
ucts’ rather than performances—e.g. painting, literature, etc.—being 
thought not to admit of improvised works. This difference between per-
formance-based and product-based artforms, and of how they are com-
monly thought of in relation to improvisation, is noted by Sawyer, who 
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suggests that this has to do with what execution in these artforms in-
volves. “Product creativity generally involves a long period of creative 
work leading up to the creative product,” he writes, while “in improvi-
sational performance, the creative process is the product; the audience 
is watching the creative process as it occurs” (Sawyer 2000: 149). Cin-
ema is a medium of ‘product creativity’ in this sense, with the creation 
and execution of a fi lm involving a drawn-out process of pre-production, 
production, and post-production, with the activities and decisions made 
at each stage being meant to result in a fi xed product, i.e. a fi lm.
To determine how a fi lm might be an improvised artwork, then, we 
need to ask what it would mean for something created over a length 
of time, usually with temporal breaks in the processes of composition 
and execution, and which results in a fi xed product, to be improvised. 
Sawyer’s example of a fi ve hour improvised painting session by Picasso 
(Sawyer 2000: 149–50) is relevant to consider, as are Sterritt’s examples 
of the ‘improvisatory’ writing of Kerouac and Burroughs (Sterritt 2000: 
163–64, 167–69). In the case of Picasso, Sawyer suggests that a painting 
is an improvised artwork just in case the artist’s process of painting it 
is done “free-form, without preconceived image or composition” (Sawyer 
2000: 149). Regarding the Beat authors, Sterritt notes that Kerouac’s 
self-styled ‘spontaneous writing’ may not have been entirely separate 
from or opposed to “planning, deliberation, pre-conceptualization, and 
other mental activities that are [not] wholly spontaneous ... in the ways 
suggested by idealized discourses of extemporaneous invention” (Ster-
ritt 2000: 163). He argues, however, that “a look at the actual method-
ologies of some paradigmatic practitioners,” such as bebop musicians, 
“suggests that spur-of-the-moment creation may not be nearly as di-
vorced from preconceived ideas, prerehearsed techniques, and prear-
ranged effects as its advocates frequently appear to believe” (Sterritt 
2000: 164). Musical improvisers, e.g. Parker, draw on personal reper-
toires of musical phrases made familiar through practice, so accepting 
their performances as improvised requires accepting that improvisa-
tion, qua in-the-moment composition, is not opposed to some amount of 
“preparation and precomposition”, even in the genres of musical perfor-
mance most commonly accepted as improvisational (Sterritt 2000: 166). 
Hence, Sterritt implies, the presence of a degree of preparation and pre-
composition in the practices of the Beat writers, including Burroughs’ 
use of existing materials to which he gave coherence through rearrang-
ing and revising, should not automatically count against claims that 
their writing was spontaneous or improvised in its execution.
These examples show that: (i) if the creative process that results 
in a fi nished product is improvised, the product itself can count as an 
improvised artwork even though it is fi xed and enduring in a way that 
a live performance is not; and (ii) a creative process can involve impro-
visation alongside some amount of preparation or even precomposition 
of some parts of the work, alongside ‘on-the-fl y’ revision. On the defi ni-
tion offered above, the resulting work will count as an improvised work 
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provided that enough of the work’s salient artistic properties result 
from improvisation in the creative process and not from precomposi-
tion, with what counts as ‘enough’ being determined on a case-by-case 
basis. This gives us some guidelines for what it would take for a fi lm 
to be an improvised work: some signifi cant part(s) of the fi lm’s creation 
must be carried out in an improvised way, with the results of these 
improvised parts of the creative process counting as signifi cant for the 
fi lm’s character as an artwork and contributing to its artistic value. 
Just what these parts of the creative process might be, and how they 
might be improvised, will be the focus of the next section.
4. Possibilities for cinematic improvisation
Ryle’s remark, quoted above, about there being no ‘internal tape’ of 
one’s action or utterance when these are improvised (Ryle 1976: 74) 
hints at what may be one reason for skepticism about the idea of a 
fi lm itself being an improvised work—in effect, a fi nished fi lm is such 
a tape, whether literally, in the case of a fi lm strip imprinted with the 
still frames that comprise each shot, arranged in a fi xed order, or fi gu-
ratively, in the case of a digital fi le containing virtual ‘imprints’ of the 
fi lm’s images in the form of bitmaps. The fi lm print (or fi le) already 
contains what the audience will see before they see it, with each proper 
screening of that print repeating the same predetermined images (and 
sounds) in the same predetermined, linear sequence.17 In this respect, 
fi lms are analogous to Ryle’s “trams” (Ryle 1976: 69). However, as the 
point above about how ‘products’ can be improvised artworks shows, 
even a fi xed sequence of images like this can be an improvised artwork 
on the above defi nition, provided the creative process of which the fi lm 
is the result involved signifi cant improvisation on the part of the fi lm’s 
maker(s).
4.1 Some ways in which a fi lm’s creation can be improvised
Given the near-universal focus on acting in the existing discussions of 
improvisation in cinema, not much needs to be added here. It is worth 
noting how improvised acting overlaps with writing, insofar as actors 
who improvise what their characters do and say are, in effect, the au-
thors of their performances, or at least parts thereof, being responsible 
for the same things—dialogue, actions, reactions, the dramatic beats 
and progression of a scene, etc.—for which screenwriters are responsi-
ble in scripted fi lmmaking. Other ways in which the writing (or rather, 
the ‘plotting’) of a fi lm can be improvised extend beyond dialogue and 
actions. If improvised scenes are shot in chronological order without a 
full script, what will happen in any one scene need not be determined 
17 An improper screening would be one in which the sequence of images and 
sounds determined by the fi lmmaker is not presented; e.g. if reels are projected out 
of order, if a DVD skips over a signifi cant number of scenes, etc.
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in advance but can follow from what the actors have done up to that 
point. In this case, the actors might not only be the authors of their 
characters’ actions and words, but can contribute to shaping the narra-
tive as a whole. Films where both the narrative and the words and ac-
tions of the characters are improvised are rare, given the requirements 
of time, money, equipment, and the coordination of multiple schedules, 
along with the uncertainty of whether anything good will result from 
the process. Something between such a fully improvised narrative and 
a traditionally pre-scripted one could involve someone—likely the di-
rector—who has a general idea of the narrative trajectory of the fi lm, 
including the ending, with the actors improvising each scene and with 
the scenario being open to revision in response to the improvisations 
within each scene as it was fi lmed.18
Cinematography—encompassing the framing and composition, 
movement, adjustments to the lens and focus (e.g. zooming, racking 
focus from foreground to background or vice versa, etc.)—also offers 
the potential for improvisation by the camera operator, who can adjust 
these elements ‘on the fl y’ in response to whatever is occurring in front 
of and around the camera. Improvising actors will almost certainly 
require the camera operator to improvise along with them, adjusting 
framing and focus and moving in response to their movements,19 but a 
camera operator can also improvise these elements independently of 
the actors, whether or not the actors are themselves improvising—e.g. 
deciding to pan away from the actors at a certain point or not to follow 
them with the camera and allow them to leave the frame, or spontane-
ously deciding to zoom in or out or change position, etc.
Just as the camera operator following and responding to actors 
can be considered improvised shooting when the movements are not 
blocked out in advance, the sound recordist/boom operator will also 
need to improvise in order to follow the actors with the microphone, 
both in traditional shooting and when actors are improvising, since the 
microphone will need to be redirected, with minimal time delay, to pick 
up the voice of each actor as he or she speaks. There does not, however, 
seem to be the same artistic potential here as there does for improvis-
ing with the camera, since the sound recordist will be limited to follow-
ing the actors without being as free to improvise the direction of the 
microphone.20 Similarly, while the choice to have actors improvise a 
18 This is how Berkeley (2011) describes the process through which he made How 
to Change the World (2008). Garrity’s Zooey and Adam (2009) and Blood Pressure 
(2012) were also made by taking a similar approach.
19 See Carney (1999: 72), on the camera operator’s need to improvise during the 
fi lming of Shadows (1959).
20 This assumes that no artistically interesting effect can be created by the sound 
recordist spontaneously deciding not to record some part of a scene, whereas one 
might be had from not following them with the camera. This difference comes down, 
I think, to the differences between visual and auditory experience, but it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to examine this further.
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scene will affect how the scene will be lit, there doesn’t seem to be room 
for the lighting itself to be improvised in any sense; rather, there will 
be less room for expressiveness on the part of the lighting crew, since 
the way to ensure that actors’ performances, which can range across 
the space of the scene in unpredictable ways, will be properly exposed 
is to light the whole space as evenly—and hence, fl atly—as possible.21
A director might seem limited in his or her ability to improvise dur-
ing the shooting of a fi lm since, whereas the camera operator and sound 
recordist are performing their roles simultaneously with the actors’ 
performances to which they can respond in the moment, a director’s 
response to what the actors or crew do during a take typically comes af-
ter the take is fi nished, through feedback and direction regarding what 
they should do differently in the next take. However, there are ways 
for a director and the actors, or the crewmembers, to watch, listen, 
and respond to one another in the moment as a take is being fi lmed. 
Furthermore, a director can give verbal feedback or cues while a take 
is being fi lmed so long as they edit out their voice afterwards, limiting 
them to talking only in moments where none of the actors is speaking.22
Despite the temporal gaps involved in the director giving direction 
between the takes, there is room for a director to carry out her role with 
spontaneity, openness and responsiveness—especially, but not only, 
when the actors and crew are themselves improvising their roles. If a 
director goes into the staging and shooting of a given scene without a 
pre-established plan for exactly how it will unfold—e.g. working with-
out fi xed storyboards or shot lists—she can discover the way she thinks 
the scene should be shot by having the actors and crew do it various 
ways before settling on one that she thinks works. This way, aspects of 
both the ‘form’ and the ‘content’ of a scene can emerge during fi lming 
rather than being decided upon beforehand. If the director’s primary 
role is to have a sense of how each element will fi t together to form the 
whole fi lm and to make sure that what is done at various points in the 
process will result in a coherent whole (cf. Wexman 1980: 34), the di-
recting can be considered improvisatory when the director’s idea of the 
whole to which the parts will add up is open and evolves in response to 
what occurs during shooting.
Although Wexman focuses on acting, she observes that a director or 
an editor “can maximize the impact of an improvised scene by subject-
ing it to imaginative editing” (Wexman 1980: 32), in effect creating a 
new ‘performance’ by assembling footage taken at different moments, 
which can alter the meaning or effect of what an actor said or did. 
While this might be done based on a prior plan, with the editor think-
ing that a certain effect would fi t well at that point in the scene and 
21 See Carney (1999: 237–38), on Cassavetes’ way of lighting scenes to give actors 
maximal range of movement.
22 David Lynch can be seen directing Laura Dern in this way in the behind-the-
scenes footage on the DVD of Inland Empire (2006).
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then looking through the footage that was fi lmed in order to fi nd pieces 
that could be assembled to create this effect, it might equally be done 
spontaneously, with the editor assembling fi lmed footage ‘intuitively’ 
such that a new, unforeseen meaning or effect emerges from the combi-
nation. There seems no reason not to call this way of working ‘improvi-
sational editing’.23 There is a precedent for this in Cassavetes’ remark 
that, after shooting multiple takes of each scene, with each take being 
done in a different way, the editing room was the real place of his im-
provisation, where he “was able to reshape the fi lm ... making whole-
sale changes in every aspect of it in light of what the fi lm itself revealed 
to him as he worked on it” (Carney 1999: 178).24 If the director’s idea of 
the whole that each part will come together to form can remain open to 
revision and evolve during shooting, it could also continue to be open 
and evolve after the fi lm has been shot but before editing is complete.
If these are some ways in which elements of the fi lmmaking process 
might be improvised, with the ‘execution’ of the fi lm as a whole consist-
ing of the execution of these parts of the process, then, combined with 
the above discussion of improvised artworks, it follows that for a fi lm 
to count as an improvised work, rather than a work that involves im-
provisation, some number of these elements will need to have been im-
provised to a signifi cant degree, and in a way that makes an important 
difference to the artistic character and value of the fi lm as a whole. The 
extent to which a fi lm is improvised will admit of degrees, allowing it 
to fall on a spectrum running from tightly pre-scripted and controlled 
productions on one end to entirely spontaneous productions on the oth-
er. For example, Ingmar Bergman’s Shame (1968), which contains one 
scene in which the lead actors improvise their conversation,25 would 
be higher on the spectrum than a fi lm in which everything, including 
framing, camera movement and how shots will be combined in editing, 
is worked out in advance—e.g. through storyboarding—and executed 
to conform to these plans. A pre-scripted fi lm in which actors had free-
dom with how they spoke their lines and moved on set, but where what 
they said and did was scripted, would fall somewhere in between.
A fi lm like The Interior (Trevor Juras, 2015) would be above Shame 
on the spectrum, since two-thirds of the scenes were fi lmed based on 
a loose outline, with the particulars of what the lead actor did and 
said and the blocking of the movements and composition of the image 
being worked out in the moment.26 However, it would be below a fi lm 
like Best in Show (Christopher Guest, 2000), since the specifi cs of what 
23 The ‘jump cuts’ in Godard’s À bout de souffl e/Breathless were the result of an 
off-the-cuff suggestion made by Truffaut during the fi lm’s editing as a way of picking 
up the pace of a scene that dragged. If the idea occurred to Truffaut in the moment, 
there would seem to be no reason not to count this as an improvised editing choice.
24 See also Carney (1999: 242–43) for other, similar remarks from Cassavetes.
25 Liv Ullmann discusses the improvised nature of this scene on the DVD features 
for the MGM release of the fi lm.
26 Personal correspondence with the fi lmmaker.
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the actor acts in the former fi lm don’t contribute as signifi cantly to the 
fi lm’s overall character as do the actors’ improvisations in the latter. 
And Best in Show would fall below Punishment Park (Peter Watkins, 
1971), a fi lm in which non-professional actors engage in real political 
argument on camera, role-playing exaggerated versions of their own 
political stances, and in which the camera operator, sound recordist, 
and director themselves improvised the recording and, in places, their 
interaction with the on-camera actors (see Rapfogel, 2007). Near the 
top of the spectrum would come a fi lm like Zooey and Adam (Sean Gar-
rity, 2009), which was made working from a three page idea of the 
characters and the basic dramatic situation, with nearly every element 
of the fi lmmaking process being improvised and with the overall narra-
tive, its structure, and the characters’ dramatic development evolving 
during the production process.27 Given what I have argued above, fi lms 
closer to the top end of the spectrum, like Punishment Park and Zooey 
and Adam, should be counted as improvised fi lms, while those near the 
other end, like Shame and The Interior, will count only as fi lms that 
involve improvisation, being more like concertos with cadenzas than 
the Köln Concert.28
4.2 The positive artistic potential of improvised fi lmmaking
From interviews and statements about their own work, many fi lmmak-
ers who use improvisation do so to gain a sense of realism, i.e. to have 
the actors’ performances or other aspects of the fi lm such as the cam-
erawork feel ‘fresh’, ‘raw’, or ‘natural’. For instance, when Leo Berkeley 
(2011), an independent fi lmmaker and media professor in Australia, 
discusses the use of improvisation in his fi lm How to Change the World 
(2008), he notes that he was motivated by seeing the performances in 
fi lms by Altman and Rivette, being “drawn to the sense of uncertainty 
and unpredictability captured in these fi lms, where moments of perfor-
mance were intensely ‘watchable’ in ways that seemed independent of 
the needs of the plot. They seemed to more successfully refl ect the com-
plexity in the interaction between two people when they relate, with 
the uncertainties, miscommunications, hesitancies, contradictions and 
confusions that can be apparent on many levels, in what is spoken and 
what is unspoken.” As he explains, he chose to have his actors impro-
vise from an outline, rather than scripting dialogue or interactions in 
27 Personal correspondence with the fi lmmaker. The website for the fi lm, www.
zooeyandadam.com, also contains information on the process by which this fi lm was 
made.
28 Films that fall in the middle of the spectrum, like Best in Show, may be 
ambiguous. Relative to fi lms lower on the spectrum, they could be considered 
improvised, but relative to fi lms higher up, they could be considered only to involve 
improvisation (though to a high degree). My instinct would be to say that, as a fi lm 
overall, Best in Show is not itself an improvised work if the acting/dialogue were the 
only elements that were improvised, but that it may be if other elements, e.g. the 
editing or the development of the narrative, were also improvised.
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advance, as a way to “[capture] these dimensions of human interaction” 
(Berkeley 2011: 3).29
While talk of ‘freshness’ or ‘rawness’ can be simplistic if referring to 
just an appearance of naturalism in the acting, or naive if it is thought 
that improvisation is suffi cient, or even necessary, for achieving this 
appearance,30 it can sometimes refer to a more substantial—and more 
artistically interesting—position that goes beyond the actors’ perfor-
mances looking like ‘real life’ human behaviour and their dialogue 
sounding like ‘real’ conversation. The interest here has to do with pre-
senting human behaviour in a way that is ontologically closer to, or 
even identical with, ‘real’ behaviour; in contrast, acting that achieves 
a naturalistic appearance when the actor is carrying out what was al-
ready conceived and worked out in the script is, in effect, a simulation 
of behaviour.31 Thinking about an action and doing it are different pro-
cesses, and anything that can be conceived of in advance by a writer 
for a fi ctional character to do involves the former, not the latter. Rather 
than presenting viewers with a pre-interpreted action whose meaning 
and place in the story are worked out in advance, improvisation pres-
ents viewers with something that was done as it was conceived, and 
before it is interpreted or understood. In this respect, it is ontologically 
on par with ordinary behaviour, which is rarely planned in advance 
and is often understood and interpreted, by those observing it and by 
the agent himself, only after it has been performed.
One artistically interesting example of a moment achievable only 
through improvisation, in which an actor’s performance and a charac-
ter’s action in the story coincide, is found towards the end of Garrity’s 
Zooey and Adam. In the scene, the character (Zooey) comes home to 
fi nd her son gone with her ex-husband (Adam) and is told that Adam 
had earlier been talking to the son about a location that featured prom-
inently earlier in the fi lm. What the improvised process of the fi lm’s 
production allows that a scripted and rehearsed fi lm would not is for 
the audience to witness the actor playing Zooey fi gure out, in real time, 
what has happened to her character’s child by actually making the con-
nection herself between this message and her memory of the mention 
of the location in a scene fi lmed some time earlier.32 The inference the 
29 For another representative example, see Dowell (2008) on the motivation 
behind the child actors in the sitcom Outnumbered being encouraged to improvise, 
forcing the actors playing the parents to improvise their reactions.
30 Improvised acting is not necessarily naturalistic acting; witness the highly 
stylized improvised performances in Céline et Julie vont en bateau/Celine and Julie 
Go Boating (Jacques Rivette, 1974).
31 Cf. Ryle (1976: 70): “The remark I am engaged in making now is not, except 
sometimes, the repetition of anything I have heard or said before. It is, though 
usually a perfectly unsurprising remark, a fresh remark composed ad hoc, namely 
to fi t a fresh conversational juncture.”
32 It is important that it was the fi rst take of actress playing this moment in the 
scene that was used. As director Sean Garrity has said in personal correspondence, 
he will often choose to use a take in which an actor is reacting for the fi rst time 
 D. Collins, Aesthetic Possibilities of Cinematic Improvisation 289
actress makes and the realization it leads to are equivalent to what the 
character in the story does in this moment, and although we can’t see 
a person’s thought process, we do see her body language and outward 
reactions as her cognitive and emotional processes occur, where much 
of her embodied response occurs unconsciously. Thus, the audience en-
counters a fi ctional event of a character going through a thought pro-
cess, inferring something, and reacting emotionally by encountering an 
actual person actually doing these things.33
When it comes to interactions between multiple characters, impro-
vised scenes will be realistic in other ways. For one thing, actual human 
interaction involve a meeting, and at times a clash, of genuinely dif-
ferent perspectives, understandings, interpretations, beliefs, etc., each 
coming from a different person. However, a single writer scripting the 
actions of a large number of characters is limited to presenting his or 
her own version of these perspectives, as imagined from his or her per-
spective, drawing from one set of personal experiences and understand-
ings rather than having a different set—i.e. each actor’s—be the basis of 
each character’s actions and utterances.34 For another thing, when each 
actor improvises her or his part without knowing what the other actors 
are thinking or what they will do, how they will respond, etc., the ac-
tors are put into the same position people are in when interacting with 
others in real life—where this is the position of the characters they’re 
to a signifi cant story event previously unknown to them, even if there are minor 
technical imperfections in the shot and even if the actor’s observable reaction is 
not particularly overt, in order to have the fi lm allow the viewer to see the actor’s 
experience in the moment and the character’s experience in the world of the fi ction 
coinciding. As he says, even if there is no discernable difference between such a take 
and a scripted performance, it nevertheless makes a difference to what it is that the 
audience is encountering—or, in philosophical terms, to the ontological status of the 
performance seen through the fi lmic recording.
33 Something similar may occur in Mike Leigh’s Vera Drake (2004), in a scene in 
which the lead character’s family is surprised by a revelation about this character, 
with the actors (other than the lead playing Vera) fi rst learning this information as 
their characters do, though I am uncertain whether the surprise occurred for the 
actors during the fi lming of the take that we see in the fi nished fi lm or whether it 
occurred earlier, e.g. during the fi lming of a previous take, or in rehearsal.
34 Watkins’ Punishment Park, and even moreso his fi lm La Commune: Paris 
1871 (2000), are good illustrations of this. In the fi rst, non-professional actors of 
different backgrounds and political persuasions—young radicals, middle-aged, 
middle-class conservatives, and those with an actual military or police background—
are allowed, as their characters, to express their own viewpoints and responses to 
what the other cast members say, which allows for the expression of a genuinely 
wider set of perspectives than if a single author, e.g. Watkins, had come up with 
what each character would say in defence of their ‘side’. In the second fi lm, a quasi-
documentary re-enactment of the titular Paris commune, the documentary research 
was largely conducted by the cast members (also non-professionals) who then were 
able express their own thoughts on what they had researched and how they thought 
the historical situation and conditions related to their contemporary lives, as well 
as role-playing members of the commune engaged in what would have been their 
historical counterparts’ daily tasks.
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playing within the fi ctional world. On the other hand, when there is a 
script that lets each actor know, in advance, what the other characters 
will say or do, this element of real human interaction is no longer part 
of the process the actors are actually going through in acting out the 
scene, and so must be ‘faked’.35 Having the story or the content of scenes 
emerge through a collaborative process of rehearsal, in the way Mike 
Leigh’s fi lms (e.g. Secrets and Lies [1996], Vera Drake [2004]) do,36 helps 
overcome the fi rst limitation, but insofar as what exactly is performed 
in front of the camera has to been worked out in advance, as in the case 
of Leigh’s fi lms, the second limitation can still apply.
This approach to presenting characters’ behaviour makes it easier 
to avoid the essentializing tendencies and reductive ‘psychologizing’ of 
most screenwriting manuals, where writers are encouraged to work out 
what a character says and does based on an inevitably narrow concep-
tion of the character’s defi ning psychological traits and dispositions, 
including his or her primary motivation and goal(s) in the narrative. 
While this approach predetermines and locks down the meaning of 
events in a fi lm’s story, improvisation in the processes of ‘constructing’ 
the scenes, narrative, and characters allows this meaning to emerge 
from, and in response to, the particular events, actions, and interac-
tions in which they are situated, where these constitute the context in 
which they ‘mean’ anything at a pragmatic level.37
While these last paragraphs have discussed improvised acting, and 
the improvisation in the ‘writing’ of a fi lm that this overlaps with, their 
point also applies to improvisation in the other elements of fi lmmaking 
discussed in §4.1. What is at issue is, in effect, the difference between 
what Ray Carney calls a “discovery model” vs. a “blueprint model” of 
artistic creation (Carney 1994: 187–88).38 Whereas the latter model 
involves presenting pre-interpreted experiences that stay within an 
artist’s existing ‘horizon’ of understanding, the latter involves form-
ing new understandings and interpretations by undergoing the experi-
35 Cf. Ryle (1976: 74), and the line about the “internal tape” quoted above. To run 
with the metaphor, a pre-written script is just such a ‘tape’, with acting from a script 
facing the problem of working out how to behave as if one hasn’t seen this tape in 
advance of doing it when, in fact, one has.
36 It is Leigh’s use of improvisation in rehearsal, and not during the actual 
fi lming (at which point a script is used), that has garnered him a reputation for 
improvisational fi lmmaking (see Movshovitz [2000]). See also Carney (1994: 
26), on the reputation of Cassavetes’ fi rst fi lm, Shadows (1959), for having been 
entirely improvised. In fact, it was an earlier version of the fi lm, developed from 
improvisations by the actors in a way that sounds similar to Leigh’s approach and 
shot in 1957, that had more of a claim to this status, but the second version of the 
fi lm that was shot in 1959, which is the version commonly known and currently 
available, was mostly made from a script Cassavetes wrote based on the fi rst, 
improvised version after being dissatisfi ed with the fi rst.
37 Cf. Wittgenstein’s (1953) arguments against ostensive defi nition and for an 
alternative ‘meaning-as-use’ account of language.
38 Cf. Collingwood (1938) on the art/craft distinction.
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ences involved in making the artwork, allowing for a responsiveness to 
this fl ow of experiences from within, rather than from an intellectual 
position ‘above’ it. As Carney writes, “Cassavetes’ style shows us what 
it looks and feels like to be in an experience, puzzling over it, emotion-
ally involved in it, intellectually responding to it (and adjusting one’s 
responses to it) as it happens” (Carney 1994: 189). Beyond the acting, 
improvisation in the camerawork or editing can contribute to the pro-
duction of a fi lm being a discovery by those making it, rather than the 
executing of a blueprint. Instead of replicating the framing and move-
ments worked out in a storyboard in order to realize a predetermined 
understanding or effect, an improvising camera operator, by searching 
within the visual space of a scene as it is played out and interpreting it 
through the details selected—and the ways chosen to pick them out, in 
terms of the framing, the movement of the camera and lens, etc.—can 
play a part in creating the understanding of the action that the fi lm 
will present to viewers. And an editor searching through footage that 
has been shot and closely attending to each take (both perceptually and 
empathetically), making intuitive connections between them instead of 
working from a shot list or a ‘paper edit’,39 is doing something similar.
While improvisation can result in a naturalistic look, it can also be 
used for anti-naturalistic purposes, e.g. to disrupt what Froger refers 
to as ‘the effect of the real’. The aim of some fi lmmakers who use im-
provisation to get away from the ‘blueprint’ model of creation can be to 
work against expectations and disrupt familiar patterns—‘blueprints’ 
for experience—in the narrative, in its cinematic presentation, and in 
the audience’s cognitive and emotional reception of the fi lm. As Carney 
explains, “Cassavetes forces [viewers] to grapple with unanalyzed and 
unexplained expressive surfaces. The viewer is put in the position of 
not knowing quite who the characters are, why they are behaving in 
the way they are, or exactly how to interpret their specifi c expressions. 
[...] The consequence is to force the viewer to abandon the attempt to 
trace expressive behaviour back to a reductive set of ‘essential’ inten-
tions, feelings, and attitudes (that is, if it doesn’t send him scurrying 
out of the theatre in bewilderment)” (Carney 1994: 10).40 Leigh makes 
a similar point in an interview, saying that “[w]hatever fi lm you watch, 
assuming you’ve seen a fi lm before, you immediately go into one pro-
gram or another, or plug into an expectation system, [but if] the fi lm is 
any good, these expectations are constantly confounded” (Movshovitz 
2000: 65–66).41 Regardless of whether improvisation, and the uncon-
ventional experiences it can give viewers, will result in a fi lm’s popular-
39 A ‘paper edit’ is a script made for the editor based on footage that has already 
been shot, indicating an order in which the shots should be assembled.
40 This suggests, contra Froger and Wexman, that the ‘confusion’ or ‘alienation’ 
that may be felt in response to a fi lm that offers an unconventional viewing 
experience is a failure of the viewer, not of the fi lm.
41 Note that Leigh’s claim “if the fi lm is any good...” implies a reversal of the 
criteria of artistic value that Froger and Wexman seem to assume.
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ity or commercial success, I contend that they are artistically interest-
ing and can be valuable, potentially adding positively to a fi lm’s artistic 
properties in a way similar to Lewis’ notion of “aesthetic thickening” 
mentioned above.
5. Conclusion: Improvisation 
and ethical implications for creation and reception
In the previous section I have argued that, on the account presented in 
§3 of what it is for an artwork to be an improvised work, there are vari-
ous ways for a fi lm not only to involve improvisation in its creation, but 
to be itself an improvised work, and that improvisation can contribute 
positively to a fi lm’s artistic value. Of course, improvising during the 
making of a fi lm is not guaranteed to contribute positively in this way; as 
with any technique or approach in artistic creation, and in any artform, 
it can be done well or poorly. I hope to have shown, partly through the 
cinematic examples I have discussed, that it has the potential to be artis-
tically interesting, that a number of fi lms that employ it are artistically 
successful because of the ways in which their making was improvised 
by those who made them, and that this aspect of such fi lms is worth at-
tending to more than it has been by fi lm scholars and philosophers of art.
As well as its artistic potential, improvisatory approaches to fi lm-
making could be said to have potentially positive social or ethical dimen-
sions.42 A typically hierarchical model of production with an industrial 
division of labour can be made more collaborative, with each member 
of the cast or crew having more substantial input into the creation and 
shaping of a fi lm than they would if carrying out a pre-assigned role, 
since being asked to improvise calls on one to engage all one’s skills 
and capacities for attention and judgment in the performance of one’s 
role, and can generate a sense of shared responsibility for a communal 
project. Moreover, the ways of relating to others involved in improvi-
sation—close attention, openness, listening, empathy, imagination, 
thoughtfulness, etc.—mirror those involved in ethical relations, where 
improvising can involve exercising and strengthening these capacities 
and dispositions. Following Hannah Arendt (1971), thinking beyond the 
‘blueprints’ formed by one’s existing beliefs and interpretations, i.e. be-
ing able to evaluate and judge the appropriateness of an action to a situ-
ation in ways that go beyond any codifi able set of ethical rules or fi xed 
principles, is arguably essential for living ethically.
In addition to potentially exercising and strengthening socially and 
ethically positive dispositions in those making the fi lm, artworks that 
are created through a ‘discovery’ rather than a ‘blueprint’ approach 
42 As with the artistic benefi ts of improvisation, these social or ethical benefi ts are 
only potentially realizable; not all productions of fi lms that involve improvisation will 
necessarily realize them, and they can be realized in non-improvised productions. I 
am discussing tendencies and potential here, not necessary and suffi cient conditions.
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have a similar potential for audiences. If, as Arendt insists, thinking 
and acting from a fi xed mental schema or blueprint can lead to ethical 
failings, works that don’t give their audiences neatly packaged under-
standings and perspectives that fi t into familiar categories, but instead 
require audiences to grapple with experiences, feelings, perspectives, 
ideas, etc. on their own terms and in their particularity, can give the 
viewers practice in what Arendt calls ‘real thinking’, along with the 
ethical skills and dispositions mentioned above. Contra Froger and 
Wexman, I contend that it shows more respect for audiences not to pan-
der to them by organizing and presenting events and experiences in fa-
miliar, conventional ways, since this assumes they will only be able to 
process and understand the familiar and the conventional—and more-
over, denies them an opportunity from which they could learn. Even if 
many viewers may likely resist such an opportunity, actively wanting 
the familiar and conventional, I would argue that it is more ethical to 
resist this resistance than give in to it for commercial success.43
I would also argue that there is a further ethical dimension, and 
perhaps even a cognitive benefi t, to audiences being open to approach-
ing a work on its terms or trying to get on its wavelength, as opposed to 
expecting it to cater to their expectations and conform to their existing 
categories and modes of understanding. This comes down to an atti-
tude of engagement with, rather than the consumption of, art. Obvi-
ously, a work need not be improvised in order for a viewer to approach 
it in this way, but the unpredictability and transcending of familiar 
conventions that improvisation often involves requires viewers also to 
transcend their expectations and familiar categories. By adapting their 
cognitive and emotional engagement to a fi lm that, through its use of 
improvisation, makes available new forms of understanding, new ways 
of perceiving, or new patterns of thinking and feeling, viewers can 
make those ways of understanding, perceiving, thinking and feeling 
their own, and so can gain—or strengthen—new ways of experiencing 
and engaging with not only fi lms or artworks, but life in general.44
43 An anecdote recounted in Carney (1994), concerns a conversation with 
Cassavetes in which the fi lmmaker, “imitating an imaginary viewer watching one 
of his fi lms ... slouched down in his chair and fl ailed his arms wildly in front of his 
face, as if shielding his eyes from the fury of an atomic blast, while chortling: ‘A new 
experience? Oh, no! Save me! Anything but that!’” (Carney 1994, 2).
44 The writing of this paper was supported in part by a doctoral fellowship from 
the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and in part by the 
University of Rijeka under the Project Number 17.05.2.2.05, Project Title: Literature 
as a Domain of Ethics. Thanks also to Sean Garrity, Trevor Juras, Eric Lewis, and 
the audience at the 2016 meeting of the Canadian Society for Aesthetics in Calgary 
for helpful comments on the ideas contained in this paper.
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